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REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECT OF PERSONAL 
INCOME TAXATION IN PAKISTAN 
VAQAR AHMED  and  CATHAL O’DONOGHUE* 
Abstract. This paper studies the redistribution effect of personal income tax in 
Pakistan. We decompose the overall tax system in order to evaluate the 
contribution of rate, allowances, deductions, exemptions and credits. The 
structure given in Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, is applied to gross household 
incomes in 2002 (low growth year) and 2005 (high growth year). Our findings 
reveal that the reforms laid down in this Ordinance resulted in a greater 
redistribution of incomes. The redistributive effect increases as we move from 
2002 to 2005 tax assessment. Deductions for salaried tax payers contribute the 
most towards progressivity. This is different from countries with advanced 
taxation systems relying mainly on allowances followed by tax rate and 
exemptions. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Personal income taxation is amongst the oldest and one of the commonly 
used instruments of fiscal policy. Besides partly fulfilling the government 
expenditure needs, income tax is also aimed at reducing the inequality gap in 
the society. They are transformed in to progressive structures so that 
principles of fairness are fully accomplished. Setting a just tax base is of 
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critical importance in order to observe the ability-to-pay principle. The extent 
of redistribution in a tax system is not necessarily a static concept. Time 
period over which we measure income and wealth are likely to influence the 
measures of redistribution and progressivity (Creedy 1999). 
 The declining role of personal income taxes in developing countries is 
certainly not a new phenomenon. Most developing economies have inelastic 
tax structures with a narrow tax base, and high collection/administrative 
costs. Hence in many cases these taxes are easy to evade (Avi-Yonah et al., 
2006; Bird et al., 2005). However the overall role of personal income 
taxation cannot be completely discarded. This is because apart from the 
distributional impact of these taxes, there are incentive effects as well, which 
can for example impact the tax payer’s decision and manner of participating 
in the labour market (Blundell et al., 2000). 
 In this paper we try to evaluate the progressivity in Pakistan’s income 
tax structure using data from Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
2001-02. We see the impact of Income Tax Ordinance for two separate 
years; 2002 (low growth year), and 2005 (high growth year). There is some 
previous research on the evaluation of tax progressivity in Pakistan. For 
example, see Ilyas (2004), Alauddin et al. (1981), Ahmed et al. (1986), 
Azfar (1972), Jeetun (1978), Malik et al. (1985, 1989). However, to our 
knowledge there is no decomposition analysis of personal income tax 
system. In the developing countries, this area of research has in the past 
received less importance, given that income tax constitutes relatively smaller 
portion of the overall revenue collections. See Sicat et al. (1988), Bird and 
Zolt (2005, 2008), Bird (2008) and Bernardi et al. (2006). 
 The next section briefly describes the personal income tax reform in 
Pakistan. Section III focuses on data and methodological issues and section 
IV then describes the components contributing to the progressivity of the tax 
system. 
II.  PERSONAL INCOME TAX STRUCTURE IN PAKISTAN 
In 1947, immediately after independence, Pakistan adopted the Income Tax 
Act 1922 of the pre-partition sub-continent. This Act was in fact introduced 
by the British in this region, who had a version called the general income tax 
introduced through Income Tax Act 1860. The Act of 1922 was based on the 
recommendations of All India Income Tax Committee which had been given 
the task of studying the income tax collections since the introduction of first 
general income tax in India. This general tax was only imposed for a period 
of 5 years in order to compensate for the mutiny of 1875. However, after the 
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great famine of 1876, this tax was revived the next year. The Act II of 1886 
then gave a scheme for income tax levy that continued in later reforms. 
 As the new forms of incomes emerged, Pakistan had to adopt a new set 
of recommendations given by the then Central Board of Revenue1 in the 
form of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The promulgation of this Ordinance 
widened the tax net and expanded the tax base. For details see Khan (1984). 
Similar need for revision was felt 21 years later when Income Tax 
Ordinance, 2001 was introduced which is still in operation subject to annual 
amendments through Finance Bill. 
 Under the present structure of income taxation, incomes are classified 
into: (a) salary, (b) income from property, (c) income from business, (d) 
capital gains, and (e) income from other sources. The salary category 
encompasses: (a) wages and remuneration, including any fringe benefits in 
money terms such as leave pay, commission, and gratuity/work condition 
supplements. Deduction is allowed if salary constitutes more than 50 percent 
of a person’s overall earnings. Zakat is deducted from the tax base. Zakat is a 
mandatory tax on all Muslim citizens if they had any earnings during the 
year. It is charged at 2.5 percent on income (and specified asset holdings). 
See Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980. Agricultural incomes have been 
exempt from taxation. This exemption is also applicable to any rent from 
agricultural land. However, more recently this type of exemption has become 
a controversial issue and has been debated on various occasions in the lower 
and upper houses of parliament. 
 Apart from the income tax there are four other types of direct taxes 
namely: wealth tax, capital value tax, worker’s welfare fund, and corporate 
assets tax. The main income tax parameters have been derived from the 
Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. There are three different income categories 
general income, salaried income and agriculture income, each having five 
different bands where incomes are being taxed according to the prescribed 
schedule. 
 The income to be taxed is computed as below:2 
 TY  =  Y – Z – WPF – WWF 
Where TY is the taxable income, Y is total income from all heads of income, 
Z is the Zakat payment by an individual, WPF is the amount paid towards 
                                                 
1Now called: Federal Board of Revenue (FBR). 
2This definition is in line with the one given in Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-02, Central 
Board of Revenue, Islamabad. 
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workers participation fund under Companies Profit (Workers’ Participation) 
Act, 1968. WWF is the amount paid to Workers’ Welfare Fund under the 
Workers’ Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971. 
 In this paper, we will mainly analyze the personal income taxation as the 
other forms of direct taxation are harder to simulate and at times lead to 
excessive use of assumptions. Furthermore the other four types of direct 
taxes yielded Rs. 7,123 million in the year 2000-01, which was 5.7 per cent 
of the total collection from direct taxes (CBR Yearbook 2000-01).3 In the 
2002 tax system, allowance is kept at Rs. 80,000 with progressive rates 
applied until Rs. 700,000 after which the highest (slab) rate of 35 per cent is 
applied. 
 As explained earlier agricultural incomes in Pakistan are exempt from 
taxes. However if a person’s agriculture income exceeds Rs. 80,000 and the 
person also has non-agriculture income then the tax rate will only apply to 
non-agricultural income of a taxpayer. 
 A special tax credit of 50 per cent of the tax payable is allowed to an 
individual if: (a) his age is 65 years or more on the first day of the relevant 
tax year, and (b) his taxable income is up to Rs. 300,000.4 Other miscel-
laneous tax credits allowed by the government in the Ordinance include; 
foreign tax credit, tax credit for donations, tax credit for investment in shares, 
tax credit for payments towards retirement annuity scheme, and tax credit for 
mark-up on loans for house. 
 A low tax base, failure to curb evasion and delay in bringing new forms 
of incomes in the tax net, has resulted in an inelastic tax structure. These 
issues although were part of the overall objectives of Income Tax Ordinance, 
however, revenue collections have not been able to keep pace with the 
growth milieu. Figure 1 shows how income tax collections have performed 
vis-à-vis real GDP growth. 
 The income tax to GDP ratio remained stagnant between the years 2000 
to 2006. However, during this time Pakistan witnessed one of the highest 
GDP growth rates in its history (reaching up to 9% percent in 2005). 
Between 2001 and 2005 the economic growth rate averaged 5.1 percent, 
however the income tax to GDP ratio remained under 3.5 percent. The share 
of income tax in total direct taxes and overall federal tax receipts also 
declined from 95.8 to 93.2 percent and 33.8 to 29.4 percent respectively. 
                                                 
3http://www.cbr.gov.pk/YearBook/2000-01/default.htm. 
4Clause [1A] of Part-III of Second Schedule in the Income Tax Ordinance. 
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FIGURE  1 
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III.  METHODOLOGY AND DATA ISSUES 
The starting point is the identification of tax related components that are used 
while going from gross incomes (I) to net incomes (NI).5 We calculate the 
tax free income (F), which in equation 1 is the sum of exemptions (E), 
allowances (A) and deductions (D). Then taxable income (TI) is calculated in 
equation 2 by subtracting tax free income from gross income. 
 DAF += + E 1 
 FITI −=  2 
 The residual income (R) is calculated in equation 3 by subtracting the 
tax liability (T) from taxable income and final residual income (Rf) is 
obtained in equation 4 by adding residual income with tax credits (C). 
 TTIR −=  3 
 CRR f +=  4 
 If credits are subtracted from tax liability (in equation 5) we get final tax 
liability (Tf), which if subtracted from gross income will give us the net 
income (equation 6). 
                                                 
5For ease of reference notations are the same as used in Pfähler (1990). 
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 CTTf −=  5 
 fTINI −=  6 
 The progressivity of tax liability can be expressed as the sum of four 
items namely rate effect, allowance effect, deductions effect, and tax credits 
effect. This is formalised below:6 
 KC
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K
R
K
N ct
c
ct
t ρπδα
δρδα
αππ −+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−−−−+−= 11  7 
Where KNπ  is Kakwani index of progressivity, t is average (gross) tax rate, c 
is average credit rate, KCρ  measures regressivity of credits, KRπ  gives the 
progressivity of rate, KAρ  measures regressiveness of allowances, KDπ  gives 
progressivity of deductions, α  and δ  indicate average allowance rate and 
average deduction rate respectively. This decomposition method developed 
in Pfähler (1990) is used in Decoster et al. (2002) and Wagstaff et al. (2001). 
 Our main data source is Pakistan’s Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey (HIES) 2001-02. The survey description shows that a total of 16400 
households were interviewed. The sample of household was drawn from 
1150 primary sampling units out of which 500 are urban and 650 are rural. 
The data in survey only provided details on net incomes. This posed a 
challenge for our analysis as we required gross incomes which can be 
subjected to tax rules. Hence to obtain the net incomes we used the net-to-
gross algorithm in XLsim microsimulation model for Pakistan (O’ Donoghue 
and Ahmed 2004). This algorithm is explained at length in Immervoll and O’ 
Donoghue (2001). 
 XLsim is a generic program designed to analyse tax-benefit policies and 
reforms. Due to the recent enormous growth in this field, tax-benefit 
microsimulation models are being developed in various languages such as C, 
Visual Basic, Gauss and SAS. However our inclination towards using XLsim 
is due to its user friendly excel-VB environment. The idea behind the actual 
design of XLsim came about as a need to demystify the large scale and 
heavily coded microsimulation systems. To construct a model using Gauss, 
for example would require considerable skill in programming and 
debugging. However for the case of XLsim, one requires intermediate level 
proficiency in MS-Excel to construct and run the model. The Xlsim model 
                                                 
6For ease of reference the notations are the same as used in Wagstaff et al. (2001). 
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uses the household data and applies the taxation rules to individual gross 
incomes. The calculations are produced both at the family and household 
level, and the difference in the disposable income between the two runs is the 
net effect of the reform. For a review of microsimulation models see 
Klevmarken (1997) and O’Donoghue (2001). For country-specific 
applications see Lloyds (2003) and Wagenhals (2004). 
 A brief explanation is required here to highlight the tax-related 
definitions as used in our analysis and exhibited in Figure 2. We have treated 
allowance as that limit of income which is not taxed. Deduction is in fact 
reduction in tax liability allowed for salary earners. Exemptions include 
incomes from agricultural activities and credit includes the special provisions 
stated in Ordinance/tax rules (explained in section 2), Zakat, and Sadaqat.7 
Data on effective payment of Zakat at the household level does not match the 
amount assessed in FBR records. Hence, for accounting purpose we have 
treated Zakat as a component that directly reduces the amount of income tax 
paid. The assumption over here is that a tax payer essentially reduces his 
payable amount by showing the Zakat accrued to him, however we are not 
certain from the FBR data if the Zakat payment was in fact made. 
FIGURE  2 
Tax System for the Year 2002 
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7Charity money. 
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 The tax system in 2002 and 2005 remained almost the same except for 
the change in allowance.8 In Figure 3 we can see that the tax liability starts 
from Rs. 100,000 instead of Rs. 80,000 (in 2002). We can also observe the 
deduction component in the tax system where the liability of those tax 
payers, whose salary constitutes more than 50 percent of total income earned, 
is lesser than the general tax payers. 
FIGURE  3 
General Vs. Salary Tax Burden 2005 
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 While going from 2002 to 2005 tax system we also uprate the income-
related characteristics in the 2001-02 household survey. Adjustments to 
various income components are made in order to accurately project the 
changes in incomes between 2002 and 2005. Separate uprating factors can be 
applied for various income sources such as; wage income, self-employment 
income, rental income, and pensions. This method has been explained in 
Stirling and Lazutka (2006). The obvious advantage of this method is that 
changes in incomes are applied at disaggregate income levels. This to some 
extent preserves the heterogeneity of the survey observations. 
                                                 
8There is also minor change in the manner of allowing deduction for salaried class. 
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IV.  RESULTS – DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT 
OF THE TAX SYSTEM 
The overall personal income tax structure in Table 1 seems progressive for 
2002 system (shown by a positive Kakwani) and redistributive (shown by a 
negative Reynolds-Smolensky). Applying the 2005 rates to the household 
incomes for the year 2002, we see an increase in progressivity, and if 2005 
rates are applied to uprated incomes, then the results indicate a reduction in 
progressivity of about 1 percent (from 0.547 to 0.542). However, uprated 
2005 system seems more redistributive as shown by the decline in R-S. The 
percentage change of Gini coefficient for net income over gross incomes 
shows a 3.7 percent decline compared to 3.2 in 2002 system (Table 2). This 
is also an indicator of over time redistribution of the Income Tax Ordinance, 
which is revised every year (through a Finance Bill) keeping in view the 
changes in incomes. 
 The low values of Reynolds-Smolensky (R-S) seem plausible as there is 
inequal redistribution shown by tax base and rate structure (Table 1). Only 
allowances and deductions have been responsible for contributing towards 
redistribution in overall personal income tax system. The role played by 
allowances and deductions also seems to be slightly declining overtime. 
Progressivity in both tax rate and base is declining over time.9 This is seen in 
the overtime reduction in value of Kakwani for all sub-components namely; 
allowances, deduction, exemptions and credits. The highest change is in 
Kakwani measure for allowance falling by 2 percent (from 0.501 to 0.491). 
A closer look reveals that the progressivity pattern of tax base and allowance 
remained identical. 
 If one is to focus on only the role played by income tax reforms in 
reducing income inequality then we can observe in Table 2, first column, 
where the Gini coefficient of post-tax income declines by 3.2 percent as 
compared to pre-tax income. We can see the dominance of 2005 system over 
2002 in terms of change in (greater) redistribution. The former shows a 
greater decline in all inequality indicators. 
 Generalised Entropy (GE) indicators are used in order to assess 
sensitivity towards inequality across the income distribution. GE measures 
satisfy five axioms which are desirable for a measure of inequality namely; 
 
                                                 
9However, if the incomes are not uprated and 2005 system is applied to 2002 incomes then 
there is increase is progressivity. 
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TABLE  1 
Decomposing Personal Income Tax System 
Tax Components Kakwani Reynolds-Smolensky 
Overall Income Tax   
 2002 0.547 –0.012 
 2005 0.564 –0.011 
 2005_u* 0.542 –0.015 
Tax Rate Structure   
 2002 0.602 0.018 
 2005 0.621 0.015 
 2005_u 0.595 0.021 
Tax Base Structure   
 2002 0.502 0.140 
 2005 0.532 0.115 
 2005_u 0.492 0.132 
Allowance   
 2002 0.501 –0.121 
 2005 0.531 –0.105 
 2005_u 0.491 –0.117 
Deduction   
 2002 0.621 –0.005 
 2005 0.640 –0.002 
 2005_u 0.613 –0.003 
Tax Credits   
 2002 0.588 0.005 
 2005 0.617 0.004 
 2005_u 0.586 0.006 
Exemptions   
 2002 0.590 0.026 
 2005 0.591 0.025 
 2005_u 0.577 0.028 
*2005_u: 2005 tax system with incomes uprated from 2002 household data. 
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the transfer principle, scale independence, population independence 
anonymity and decomposability. GE ranges from zero (complete inequality) 
to infinity (see Cowell, 1995). An increase in GE parameter implies less 
sensitivity towards inequality at the lower end of the distribution. GE(0) is 
the mean log deviation, giving higher weight to income differences at the 
lower end of distribution. GE(1) is Theil index of inequality that gives equal 
weight to the entire income distribution. GE(2) is one half the squared 
coefficient of variations and gives more weight at the upper end. We can 
observe in Table 2 that the highest change (while comparing pre and post tax 
incomes) is in the case of GE(2). This is because the upper tail of income 
distribution is most affected by the imposition of a progressive personal 
income tax and income earners falling in this upper tail end up paying a 
higher marginal rate. 
TABLE  2 
Percentage Change in Net Income Over Gross Income 
 2002_n/g 2005_u_n/g 
Gini –3.2 –3.7 
GE(1) –7.9 –9.6 
GE(0) –5.4 –6.4 
GE(2) –12.1 –15.0 
*n/g: Percentage change in net income over gross income. 
2005_u: 2005 tax system with incomes uprated from 2002 data. 
 Table 3 exhibits the percentage contribution of various tax components 
(towards progressivity) under each of the three systems. The clearly stagnant 
contributions are observable between the 4 years (2002 to 2005). The 
percentage contribution of rate effect, allowances and deductions remains 
constant. The contribution of exemptions slightly decreases, while that of 
credits increase. The later’s increase is plausible given that the increase in 
Zakat payable is directly related to increase in pre-tax incomes. Recall from 
previous section that for the purpose of tax accounting in household data we 
have treated Zakat payment as a tax credit. 
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TABLE  3 
Percentage Contribution Towards Progressivity 
Tax Components 2002 2005 2005_u 
Rate effect 20.8 20.7 20.8 
Allowance 17.3 17.7 17.2 
Deductions 21.4 21.3 21.4 
Exemptions 20.3 19.7 20.2 
Credits 20.3 20.6 20.5 
Total 100 100 100 
*2005_u: 2005 tax system with incomes uprated from 2002 data. 
 How do the component-wise contributions in Pakistan compare with 
other countries? We try to see from Verbist (2004) and Urban (2006) the 
percentage contribution towards progressivity in other developed and 
transition economies. Selected countries are grouped in Table 4. In this 
cross-country comparison we can observe that in pursuit of progressivity, 
countries with advanced taxation systems rely on allowances followed by 
rate and exemptions. Pakistan being a low-income country having a much 
narrower tax base relies on deductions followed by rate and exemptions. 
Recall that deduction here represents reduction in tax liability allowed for 
salary earners. 
TABLE  4 
Cross-Country Comparison: Percentage Contribution Towards Progressivity 
Countries Exem-ptions 
Deduc-
tions 
Allow-
ances Rate Credits Overall R-S 
Austria 16.8 0.5 0.1 47.3 35.3 100 0.061 
Ireland 34.5 –2.5 31.2 38.7 –1.9 100 0.055 
Netherlands 8.1 –4.5 25.1 71.3 – 100 0.046 
UK 55 –2.4 30.7 14.4 2.3 100 0.046 
Croatia – – 85.8 14.3 –0.2 100 0.031 
Pakistan 20.3 21.4 17.3 20.8 20.3 100 0.012 
Source: For first four countries; Verbist (2004). For Croatia; Ivica Urban (2006). 
For Pakistan: Author's own calculation. 
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 Table 5 gives a comparison of post tax incomes for 2002 and 2005. The 
Gini coefficient for 2005 post tax uprated incomes increased by 1.4 percent 
compared to 2002. Even if the incomes are not uprated for 2005, still there is 
an increase of 0.18 percent in inequality. This implies that overtime changes 
in the tax system (resulting in higher redistribution from 2002 to 2005) are 
unable to reduce the already unequal pre-tax income gap. The rise in incomes 
around 2005 has favoured the higher income groups resulting in an increase 
in Gini coefficient. 
TABLE  5 
Percentage Change in Inequality Measures for 2005 over 2002 
 2005/2002 2005_u/2002 
Gini 0.18 1.4 
GE(1) 0.28 3.2 
GE(0) 0.28 3.4 
GE(2) 0.23 4.3 
*2005_u: 2005 tax system with incomes uprated from 2002 data. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Pakistan like other developing economies has a narrow tax base with high 
enforcement costs, making personal income taxation an unlikely cornerstone 
of a comprehensive inequality reduction agenda. However its role cannot be 
completely written-off given the potential contribution towards efficiency 
and equity objectives at the national level. 
 Our main findings are: 
● Income Tax Ordinance resulted in greater redistribution. The 
redistributive effect increases as we move from 2002 to 2005 tax 
assessment. 
● Deductions for salaried tax payers contribute the most towards 
progressivity. This is different from countries with advanced 
taxation systems relying mainly on allowances followed by tax rate 
and exemptions. 
● Given the increasing pre-tax income gap, reforms in taxation cannot 
be entirely relied upon for a reduction in inequality in the society.10 
                                                 
10The need for social protection policies and social safety nets remains. 
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● Progressivity pattern of tax base and allowance is identical. 
 There is a need to reform the present structure of exemptions. Income 
from agriculture (almost a quarter of GDP) is exempt from taxation. 
Agriculture taxation in Pakistan has been a matter of both parliamentary 
controversy and bureaucratic contention. For a very long time the presence 
of a dominant feudal class in the parliament implied that no headway could 
be made in this direction. However, on the insistence and continuous 
pressure from the multilateral donors and agencies a plan was chalked out to 
levy the tax on agriculture incomes subject to a consensus on a suitable tax 
base. However the actual imposition of such a tax is still not clearly defined 
to serve the macroeconomic purpose of broad basing the tax base and the 
microeconomic purpose of decreasing income inequalities (see World Bank, 
1999; Chaudhry, 2001). The tax office has been unclear as to what will be a 
better instrument for agriculture taxation, i.e. should the tax be levied on 
agricultural produce, land value, value of agriculture inputs, value of output 
sold etc. In order to increase the tax to GDP ratio, indirect tax will remain the 
primary instrument in the medium term. There is a need to further study the 
distributional impact of bringing new services in to the tax net. The existing 
structure of sales tax also has the potential of being made a progressive tax. 
These issues require further research. 
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